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Abstract
Frameworks that govern the development and application of novel products, such as the products of synthetic
biology, should involve all those who are interested or potentially affected by the products. The governance
arrangements for novel products should also provide a democratic mechanism that allows affected parties to
express their opinions on the direction that innovation does or does not take. In this paper we examine rationales,
obstacles and opportunities for public participation in governance of novel synthetic biology products. Our analysis
addresses issues such as uncertainties, the considering of alternative innovations, and broader social and
environmental implications. The crucial issues in play go beyond safety alone, to include contending social values
around diverse notions of benefit and harm. The paper highlights the need for more inclusive social appraisal
mechanisms to inform governance of Synthetic Biology and alternative products, and discusses a few practical
methods to help achieve this goal.
Background
New synthetic biology [1] and gene drive [2] technolo-
gies raise prospects like: altering or suppressing entire
populations of disease vectors or agricultural pests by re-
leasing just a few genetically modified organisms [3]; or
revolutionising agricultural production by synthesising
products such as palm oil [4]. These developments have
led to widespread reconsideration of current risk-based
governance mechanisms as means to balance associated
risks and opportunities [5]. Here we define governance
to be the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and
organizations through which political actors influence
environmental actions and outcomes [6]. Risk-based
mechanisms aim to help the decision maker balance the
potential benefits of innovation against the potential
harms to humans and their environments, whilst recog-
nising the uncertainties associated with both [7].
Current reconsiderations within the field of risk as-
sessment emphasise that the assessments should not be
restricted in scope to human safety-related parameters
but should embrace wider ecological and societal issues
[8], which will likely raise deeper questions about the
governance of synthetic biology in democratic societies
[9–11]. Other pertinent issues in this view include the
need for methods to help formalise the inherently sub-
jective choices that determine how a risk-assessment is
framed [12], characterise the quality of quantitative in-
formation used in a risk assessment [13], and how to
make governance procedures flexible and precautionary
in face of the “deep uncertainty” that accompanies many
new technologies [12].
The desire to include deliberative procedures within
the governance arrangement of synthetic biology has led
various agencies to assert the need to engage communi-
ties, stakeholders and broader publics in decision mak-
ing processes. The National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering and Medicine [13] for example, recom-
mends that “defined mechanisms and avenues for [pub-
lic] engagement should be built into the risk assessment
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and decision-making process from the beginning”. This
recommendation is echoed by the International Risk
Governance Council [14] who call for regulatory agen-
cies to “prototype new approaches for iterative risk ana-
lyses that incorporate external peer review and public
participation”.
It implies no necessary criticism of such calls to note
that public participation, as opposed to communication,
is not routinely practised in existing risk assessments,
and important questions can be raised about underlying
rationales. In the words of a former executive in the US
Environmental Protection Agency, there typically exist
highly diverse and often contending motivations to enact
procedures nominally referred to as “participatory” [15].
Aims may variously be: ‘substantive’ - i.e. about making
better decisions; ‘normative’ – i.e. about pursuing appro-
priate process in a democracy; or ‘instrumental’ - about
engineering pre-existing aims [16]. This latter category
includes: fostering trust [17]; providing justification [18];
securing acceptance [19]; and managing blame [20]. In
this paper we focus on substantive approaches to public
participation that involve genuine empowerment of all
affected parties in the interests of making better choices
among contending innovation or policy pathways in any
given field [21].
It is also important to recognise that these drivers for
more participatory practices are not new. Similar calls
for more inclusive risk-based governance have been
made previously in the context of genetically modified
plants [22], and for risk assessment more generally [23],
on the stated grounds that: (i) early public engagement
can provide information that improves decisions; (ii)
including stakeholders and the public in the
decision-making process leads to more trusted decisions;
and, (iii) citizens have a right to influence decisions
about issues that affect them [24]. If public engagement
exercises around synthetic biology or gene drives are to
be credible or robust in the substantive terms described
above, then they should not be restricted to issues of risk
or safety alone, nor confined merely to the ways in
which a new technology should be introduced [25].
Rather than focussing on one particular innovation,
participatory practices need to provide a balanced ana-
lysis of the relative pros and cons of a diversity of con-
trasting policies and innovations that are able to address
the same societal or environmental functions [21]. This
prevents the process being reduced simply to a means to
modulate implementation of one particular technology.
Comparative appraisal opens the possibility that a
strongly-backed new technology might, under appropri-
ate circumstances or perspectives, be deprioritised in
favour of an alternative strategy [21]. As highlighted in a
recent report for the UK Government Chief Scientist,
the enabling of societies to exercise agency over the
directions taken by innovation in this way is, at one
level, a basic imperative of democracy [26].
It is against this background that this paper examines
the opportunities and barriers that exist to substantive
public engagement and participation in risk-based gov-
ernance frameworks. A key emphasis will lie in exploring
relations with quantitative, probabilistic approaches to
risk assessment that have recently been recommended
for synthetic biology products like gene drives. We pay
attention to examining mechanisms that assist substan-
tive public engagement and so allow for more societally
robust and democratically accountable social choices of
technology in these fields [27].
The issues addressed in this paper, then, are not just
about whether or what kind of public participation
might be required in each step in a typical risk assess-
ment. Instead, it is risk assessment itself that is placed in
wider context. Nor is this simply a matter of ‘bolting on’
some additional processes around a conventional regula-
tory appraisal. Since the answers obtained in risk assess-
ment depend on both questions and assumptions, the
point becomes clear that if risk assessment itself is to be
regarded as rigorous, then it needs to be as systematic
and robust about its own qualitative framing conditions
as it already tries to be about quantitative data and ana-
lysis [28].
So, public participation should not be seen as a matter
of ‘political correctness’ or as a means to achieve a
pre-conceived end, but rather as inherent to the rigour
and effectiveness of regulatory assessment. It allows at-
tention to extend beyond crucial questions over ‘how
safe?’, to address equally imperative issues over ‘which
way?’ innovation should go in any given field; and ‘who
says?’ and ‘why?’ [28]. If these substantive kinds of issue
are attended to, then regulatory assessment of synthetic
biology and gene drives can move from a purely
risk-based analysis, to diverse – more substantive – pro-
cesses of ‘social appraisal’ [17].
Risk assessment and social appraisal
In this section, we consider the practical implications of
the issues raised above for a risk-based governance sys-
tem of synthetic biology products such as gene drives.
To this end, Fig. 1 kicks off with an overview of the
steps involved in a conventional risk assessment process.
It is important to emphasise that this Figure is a simpli-
fied and idealised version of a risk assessment process.
In practise, risk assessments rarely if ever follow all the
stages, or pursue the sequence described here with pre-
cision. It is presented here as a model to facilitate the
discussion within the paper.
The assessment has essentially three stages, labelled:
(i) Identify, define and agree; (ii) Calculate, evaluate and
manage; and (iii) Monitor, validate and compare. The
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steps within each of these three stages were originally
described in the context of assessing and managing the
environmental risks posed by the release of transgenic
fish [29]. We have annotated these steps to distinguish
those parts of the overall risk assessment process where
public participation is essential if the assessment is to
broaden and achieve the substantive imperative of a so-
cial appraisal process.
To begin, it is widely recognised to be essential, at
least for novel technologies such as gene drives, that ‘the
public’ are engaged in the opening steps of the first
(identify, define and agree) stage of a risk assessment
process. Indeed, these first steps are designed to engage
the public in an initial discussion about the problem that
the technology or product is designed to address, and
the extent to which this problem might be addressed
with other new or existing technologies or practices.
Public engagement at this stage is essential for several
reasons. In the first instance, different ‘publics’, that is
constituencies with contrasting understandings, values
and interests, must agree that the problem at hand is
real and that a novel technological solution is at least
worth contemplating. Failure to successfully engage di-
verse publics at this stage is likely to lead to immediate
opposition, as occurred with Oxitec’s proposal to release
genetically engineered sterile male mosquitoes in the
Florida Keys [30]. Furthermore, any activity that poten-
tially exposes publics to environmental or health risks is
unethical if there are alternative, more benign options,
or if there is no expectation of possible benefits [31]. In
other words, there must be some agreed basis that a
problem currently exists, leading to appropriate justifica-
tion of need [32].
If a particular technological ‘solution’, such as a syn-
thetic gene drive, is propounded as a potentially effective
response to an agreed problem, either on its own or as
part of an integrated package of solutions, then add-
itional community engagement is desirable for ethical
and practical reasons [33]. In terms of the risk analysis
steps, stakeholders can at this point make useful contri-
butions to: (i) defining the boundaries and scope of the
assessment, for instance concerning which alternatives
are considered; (ii) describing conceptual models of the
environmental and socio-economic systems that the
Fig. 1 An idealised scientific risk assessment process (amended from [29]). A flow chart showing steps where public participation would be
essential under a social appraisal process and easily facilitated (solid green), essential but harder to achieve (solid orange), and essential but
difficult to achieve (solid blue) for novel synthetic biology products. Pattern shading represents steps where public participation may be useful
but not essential to a social appraisal process
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options will interact with; (iii) identifying valued compo-
nents or processes of these systems (assets); and (iv)
identifying circumstances that could lead to adverse out-
comes (hazards) if the technology is deployed. Facilitated
discussions with broad groups of stakeholders at this
stage have been shown to improve the conceptual un-
derstanding of systems and the hazard identification
stage [34].
In these early stages of the process it is particularly im-
portant that the governance regime does not restrict or
suppress an adequate exploration of alternative (social
or technological) responses. Appraisal should devote
symmetrical attention to all considered alternatives and
offer a balanced picture of associated pros and cons as
seen by affected stakeholders – particularly those that
have no commercial interest in the technology con-
cerned. For instance, many effective alternative innova-
tions in seed production are often excluded from
regulatory appraisal processes around the world, in
favour of more energetically-propounded transgenic op-
tions that offer attractive private benefits from intellec-
tual property, profits from value chains or sales of
associated products [24]. These neglected alternatives
can include: ‘marker selection’ [35]; participatory breed-
ing [36]; agricultural extension services [37]; and open
source seed sharing methods [38], which all harness the
innovative capacities of farmers themselves and help
tailor crop development to local conditions [39]. If alter-
native approaches like these are to be given a fair hear-
ing, then they must be addressed by wider practices of
social appraisal that extend risk assessment attention be-
yond a single or narrow set of options.
The third main component in Fig. 1 - identifying as-
sets - becomes particularly important when addressing
novel technologies, because the ‘assets’ determine assess-
ment endpoints – i.e. values that risk assessment is try-
ing to protect. The assessment endpoints in turn
determine the measurement endpoints – i.e. the things
that the risk assessment will make predictions about
[40], and these should be used to identify the risk ac-
ceptance criteria that support a decision and a compli-
ance monitoring strategy. Public engagement is essential
at this step, in order to ensure that the risk endpoints,
and hence acceptance criteria, reflect the values that af-
fected communities actually hold. If risk assessment fails
to do this, the focal product is unlikely to be considered
acceptable, irrespective of the assessment outcomes. If
assessment is not understood to address community
values, it is likely to be perceived as irrelevant, at best – or
at worst, as representing other vested interests.
Practically it is more difficult to undertake public en-
gagement in the second stage in the idealised framework
(labelled Calculate, evaluate and manage in Fig. 1). This
stage aims to determine risks for an agreed set of
priority hazards. Risk calculations can be performed
qualitatively or quantitatively, but here we focus on
probabilistic risk assessment calculations. With a prob-
abilistic risk assessment, the scope for public engage-
ment in this second stage is much reduced, largely
because of the particular kinds of expertise required and
associated barriers around styles of knowledge and un-
derstanding including language (discussed below).
Probabilistic risk assessment for novel technologies, at
least initially, must rely on opinions and beliefs. Classical
actuarial approaches are not possible because the tech-
nology’s operational history is limited and/or its poten-
tial adverse outcomes occur at a very low frequency. A
key feature of probabilistic risk assessment in these cir-
cumstances is that opinions are typically elicited from
experts using formal methods (see for example [41]
carefully designed to minimise the various forms of am-
biguity caused by the natural vagueness of language [42,
43]), and to provide predictions that can be (in)validated
with observations. In theory these methods could be
employed to elicit the opinions of stakeholders and
thereby help to expose differences in opinion that might
be masked by different interpretations of the same word,
such as “negligible”. But we are unaware of any examples
of this in practise, perhaps because of the barrier that
probabilistic methods present.
It is still possible, but somewhat more difficult, to en-
gage publics around the formulation of what in risk as-
sessment parlance are termed ‘loss functions’. These
functions express the loss that occurs following a pre-
dicted change in the value of a measurement endpoint –
i.e. they measure the possible consequences should ad-
verse outcomes occur. In financial contexts, loss func-
tions are typically expressed as a change in the monetary
value of a portfolio over time [44]. In a human health
context, loss is also relatively readily defined [45, 46].
Such functions can help make explicit the particular
value judgements embedded in any given assessment
that underlie a specific interpretation of impact, and fa-
cilitate comparisons with other equally-reasonable values
that might yield different interpretations [47, 48]. In eco-
logical contexts, the concept of loss is more ambiguous
and value laden – so it is therefore more desirable, but
at the same time more difficult, for publics to be en-
gaged in the formulation of the way in which the eco-
logical consequences of adverse outcomes are measures
and expressed [49–51].
It is also essential for interested and affected commu-
nities to be engaged in this second stage of the risk as-
sessment procedure around issues of “acceptability”. For
new technologies this is typically a difficult stage. Public
engagement is only meaningful here if involved commu-
nities have previously contributed to risk acceptance cri-
teria (stage 1) and have also been kept informed of
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observed outcomes, and decisions that arise following
these observations (stage 3). Perhaps most importantly, a
focus on “acceptance” can only be considered valid, if
the assessment gives equal attention to the pros and
cons of a variety of alternative technologies or strategies
with the same policy aims.
Finally, the overall objective of the third and last stage
of the conventional risk assessment framework is to
compare risk predictions to observed outcomes. Testing
risk and benefit predictions against observed outcomes
is an important science quality criteria: to comply with
the scientific method, risk predictions must be, at least
theoretically, capable of being invalidated by observa-
tions. At this stage it is also possible – and sometimes
desirable on cost grounds – to engage interested and af-
fected communities in monitoring strategies through, for
example, citizen science activities [52].
Again, in substantive terms, it is important to empha-
sise that questions around benefit and harm must be di-
rected to the potential pros and cons associated with a
diverse array of alternative policy options. It should be
noted, however, that contrasting dimensions of each op-
tion may not necessarily be subject to simple trade-offs,
and methods beyond those usually associated with
risk-based governance mechanisms may be needed to
address the complex, dynamic and uncertain relations
between wider social and environmental values – as well
as entirely-valid and reasonable, but non-utilitarian ways
of reasoning [53, 54].
For example Fig. 2 shows one characterisation, among
many other variants in the literature [55–58] of four
contrasting aspects of incertitude. This identifies a
variety of methods that may serve useful functions in
substantive social appraisal – including as bridges, cata-
lysts and frameworks for wider processes of public par-
ticipation. Terminology can be controversial, so the
point of Fig. 2 is not to insist on words. The term ‘un-
certainty’, for instance, is used in a variety of sometimes
opposing ways [59, 60]. Bayesians assert that subjective
probability is the only coherent way to perform the
types of comparisons across multiple options with un-
certain outcomes that a substantive social appraisal
process demands [61] and that subjective probability
is in principle an adequate way to represent uncer-
tainty due to knowledge gaps and the uncertainty
caused by the inherent variability of many real-world
processes [62].
Other probability theorists point out, however, that it
must be acknowledged at least in principle, that there is
always a possibility that a situation will arise under
which there exists no firm basis for confidence in the
values that might be taken by probability distributions
[63]. Indeed, under these conditions, some probability
theorists acknowledge a condition under which – in
objective terms – probabilities simply “do not exist”
[64]. This may be because neither historical evidence
nor the completeness of available models are felt to be
sufficient to derive likelihoods for all relevant real-world
outcomes. To assert single probability distributions
under such conditions would involve “pretence of know-
ledge” [65]. Following longstanding usage in policy
appraisal over the past century [66, 67], it is this condi-
tion that is referred to in Fig. 2 here as ‘uncertainty’.
Other terms may legitimately be preferred, but it is
Fig. 2 Different aspects of incertitude. As distinguished in relation to the fundamental parameters of risk assessment (probabilities and outcomes)
(adapted from [28])
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crucial not to let reluctance to name this condition lead
to a situation in which it is simply ignored [28].
The practical point here, however, is clear. The key is-
sues that arise are: (i) probabilistic methods can present
a barrier to public participation; and, (ii) it is crucial to
consider whether alternative approaches to uncertainty
provide a coherent and transparent way to analyse pros
and cons of different technological solutions. It is to this
end, that frameworks like that offered in Fig. 2 can offer
one useful input among many, in prompting greater
consideration.
A crucial further point in Fig. 2 is that challenges in
social appraisal do not just involve problematic know-
ledge about likelihoods, but also different kinds of
‘contradictory certainty’ over meaning [68]. Referred to
as ‘ambiguity’ – meaning the condition of being open to
more than one interpretation - in Fig. 2, these disagree-
ments may concern: interests or values; ‘benefits’ or
‘harms’; or alternative policy options [69]. It is a matter
of analytical rigour to recognise that such dilemmas also
mean that there can in principle exist no uniquely opti-
mal analytical solution [70, 71]. This further underscores
the substantive importance of participation [72–75].
Taken together, the main issue that arises in all this is
simply the need to recognise: a) that some level of ignor-
ance will always exist with a new technology – where
“unknown unknowns” [76] mean “we don’t know what
we don’t know” [55]; and b) that a substantive social ap-
praisal entails value based judgements that probabilistic
risk assessment techniques are not designed to address.
This makes it important that governance embeds
risk-based assessment in a broader social appraisal that
includes public participation [77].
Obstacles and promises of public participation
What the preceding discussion has shown is that the
scope and methods of risk-based governance need to be
broadened if the substantive issues raised by new tech-
nologies like synthetic biology and gene drive technolo-
gies are to be addressed. These considerations require
attention to a broader set of practical methods, beyond
those currently used in risk assessment, for wider social
appraisal [78]. Here, a multiplicity of forms of public
participation become recognisable as crucial means to
help achieve both analytical rigour and democratic ac-
countability in the framing and implementation of gov-
ernance measures.
Potential obstacles to public participation in the cru-
cial first steps of the first stage of a risk assessment in-
clude language barriers, conflicting styles of knowledge,
and availability and accessibility of information. The ex-
tent to which these are actual barriers will vary on a case
by case basis, but in general these obstacles are likely to
be more acute in developing nations [78].
Cost is also a significant barrier – from the perspectives
of both sponsors and participants. Public participation ac-
tivities can be costly to organize, in terms of labor, logis-
tics, preparatory materials, and design of interactions [79].
Equally costly is the time and effort expended by partici-
pants, especially in a political-cultural environment that
does not make it clear that such participation will make a
meaningful difference in decision making [80]. Put an-
other way, a major obstacle is the credibility that it will be
worthwhile for publics to bother to participate.
Under a view that participation will focus primarily on
modalities for implementation, and participation is
merely about ‘deciding how to do it’, the value of the en-
gagement is the sharing of perspectives and knowledge,
and such sharing can be costly. For example, the costs of
organizing engagement at each step of a laboratory study
would be prohibitive, suggesting that some balance
needs to be achieved in terms of the frequency and in-
tensity of engagement and its costs to enact.
The transaction costs of public engagement are more
difficult to compute and less relevant, however, under a
contrasting view that participation should extend to the
possibility that an alternative strategy will be substituted.
Here the value of engagement could be larger, but
harder to determine, if the costs of adverse effects are
avoided by pursuing an alternative strategy.
Either way, we note that “transaction costs” implies
that what is valuable is the exchanged “material,” while
the transaction itself is worthless and should be mini-
mized to the greatest extent for the sake of efficiency. In
the case of engagement, however, the transaction has
value - both in terms of what is exchanged and the ex-
perience of connecting with others who have different
knowledge, perspectives, and values. These transactions
have the potential to build relationships, trust, and
insight. The value of these achievements are difficult to
measure but we nonetheless suggest it is helpful to con-
sider both the “transaction costs” and “transaction bene-
fits” of stakeholder and public engagement.
Synthetic biology products and gene drives in particu-
lar may raise specific challenges in this context: (i) they
are often described in very technical, domain-specific,
terminology that is not accessible to a wide audience. To
understand their production processes and modes of ac-
tion requires a high degree of training or a significant
amount of editorial effort to de-mystify the language; (ii)
techniques such as CRISPR based gene-editing have low-
ered technological barriers and substantially compressed
design to production cycles, enabling the field to move
rapidly. This in turn can reduce the lead-in time for risk
assessment and social engagement activity; and, (iii) low
threshold gene drives will theoretically spread through-
out the domain of an entire target population. If a target
species has a large range, for example a mosquito
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malaria vector found across sub-Saharan Africa, the
number and diversity of potential stakeholders could be
larger than that encountered with other new products.
The nature and severity of these issues will vary on a
case by case basis, but taken together they could signifi-
cantly raise the costs of a substantiative engagement
process.
On the other hand, of course, costs incurred when un-
duly narrow governance circumscribes assessment, ex-
cludes alternatives or sidelines relevant uncertainties can
prove to be very large [81, 82]. Once realised, it can be
extremely costly to address (potentially irreversible) en-
vironmental effects [83, 84] or shift away from technolo-
gies that have already locked in [26, 85–87]. These
possible wider burdens of narrow governance are im-
portant to take seriously, because they often fall most
heavily on people who are in other ways most excluded
and vulnerable [21, 88–90].
Against this background, there are a diversity of prac-
tical participatory methods. For instance, risk assessment
may usefully be informed by carefully-structured work-
shops like Problem Formulation Options Assessment
(PFOA) methodology [91]. The PFOA methodology has
been specifically designed to front-end a risk-based gov-
ernance framework for novel technologies and has been
successfully applied to GM crops in Kenya [92]. Multi-
criteria mapping is another approach that has been ap-
plied with some success [93]. Also yielding concrete
quantitative pictures – alongside a rich body of qualita-
tive information – concerning a diversity of contrasting
innovation pathways, this has also been used to explore
GM maize and parallel options in Kenya [94].
Engaging stakeholders in the conceptual modelling
and hazard identification stage of the risk assessment
can be facilitated by using graphical conceptual model-
ling methods, such as cartoons, influence diagrams and
Signed Directed Graphs [95]. Graphical conceptual
methods also provide a structure for, and therefore fa-
cilitate, public participation in the identification of as-
sessment and measurement endpoints, and can also
guide the development of quantitative models that are
otherwise difficult to engage the public in due to the
technical hurdles that they present. Signed Directed
Graphs have added advantages in this context as they
provide the basis for analysis of the effects of feedback
in complex systems [96], including the socio-economic
systems that are coupled to, and drivers for, the environ-
mental systems that may be perturbed by a novel
technology.
Irrespective of any particular methods, substantive
aims in technology governance should also be responsive
to ‘uninvited’ engagement by marginal voices on their
own terms [97]. Many methods also exist to help enable
this – including: open space [98], participatory rural
appraisal [99], deliberative mapping [100], do-it-yourself
juries [101], participatory technology assessment
(https://ecastnetwork.org), and action research [102] –
which if properly undertaken can help to further these
aims.
Despite the complexity and diversity of views, then, it
is possible to draw some firm overall conclusions. Quite
simply, broader public participation in environmental
decision making leads to better quality decisions [103].
There exists much scope for, as well as obstacles to,
practical extensions of existing procedures in order to
enable meaningful participatory deliberation.
In the end, the most important questions in this
process are not just about ‘yes or no?’, ‘how much?’ or
‘how fast?’ concerning a circumscribed partisan selection
of possible ‘solutions’ – but rather about fundamental is-
sues for democracy over: ‘which way?’, ‘who says?’ and
‘why?’Addressing such questions – in collaborations that
span domains of expertise and civil society – can ‘open
up’ a diversity of alternative viable policy responses
[104]. How societies address the uncertain benefits and
risks of these alternative responses, however, remains a
contentious issue and one that requires much more at-
tention than this paper allows.
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